Myanmar’s war to nowhere

Myanmar’s armed conflict is in a broad strategic stalemate. Following a series of crushing defeats, the Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, has rebuilt its depleted units with conscripts and begun to recapture limited amounts of territory from opposition forces. The regime remains adequately funded and it seems unlikely that international actors will take meaningful action to cut the supplies of jet fuel, finances or the industrial inputs that sustain the junta’s war machine. Though opposition forces now control huge areas of territory, relentless regime airstrikes and blockades are set to continue, precluding an end to the crisis in so-called ‘liberated zones’. Across the border, policymakers in China and Thailand grow increasingly impatient with the conflict’s intractability, seeking short-term solutions that in reality risk prolonging the conflict and undermining Myanmar’s autonomy.

Meanwhile, four and half years since the 2021 coup, opposition forces still cannot agree on what a lasting political solution to the conflict would look like. Domestic fragmentation is worsening and new conflicts are emerging, meaning that violence will probably continue even if the central authority is overthrown or replaced. Though it still wields some domestic and international legitimacy, the National Unity Government (NUG), a pro-democracy body formed by elected lawmakers ousted by the 2021 coup, has failed as a unifying force and is at serious risk of being sidelined. Instead, the opposition movement is dominated by a handful of powerful ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) that continue to display repressive and separatist tendencies. In the centre of the country where the Bamar majority resides, what began as a grassroots struggle for democracy increasingly resembles anarchy and warlordism.

This report assesses the landscape of the current conflict before considering three paths that the war in Myanmar could take in light of the current stalemate. In the first scenario, armed contestation, violence and instability continue at similar levels, deepening inter-group divisions and making the emergence of a democratic or federal arrangement exceedingly improbable. In the second, the Tatmadaw agrees to bilateral or non-inclusive ceasefires with a limited set of actors, leading to stability in some areas but escalation in others. In the last, a broader set of opposition groups seeks ceasefires with the Tatmadaw, resulting in an overall de-escalation of violence and potentially an opening for political dialogue, the format of which remains elusive.

Regime resurgent

Due to a series of disastrous losses between October 2023 and August 2024, the Tatmadaw could no longer deploy its mobile strike divisions to wage counter-offensives, indicating a severe shortage of personnel. To rectify this issue, the Tatmadaw began conscripting and as of August 2025 had gathered 16 batches of recruits, amounting to an estimated 60–80,000 men. With conscription intakes now streamlined at four-week intervals, the Tatmadaw has partially reconstituted its mobile strike divisions, enabling it to launch limited counter-offensives throughout 2025. In some areas, it has managed to rotate out existing units and send soldiers for rest and recuperation, further underscoring its improving force posture.

So far, conscripts appear to be fighting effectively and there have been no cases of their mass desertion or defection. While media reports show that some recruits were immediately sent to the front lines after receiving basic training, it appears that many others instead received additional training over the course of several months. According to regime sources, Russian advisers helped develop and implement the Tatmadaw’s new basic-training curriculum and it is possible that they have also provided advanced instruction for special forces and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) operators.

Though the regime must now rely on coercive recruitment methods, the dire economic crisis inflicted on the country by its policies has likely helped the conscription drive. The Tatmadaw has made efforts to show that it treats conscripts well by paying a reliable salary and establishing a committee in July 2025 to help soldiers find jobs after their service is over. This has been enough incentive for some desperately poor young men, especially from slums, to sign up. Conscription is also facilitated by the Union Solidarity and Development Party, the military’s ostensible proxy party, which has gathered thousands of recruits by offering cash inducements, according to multiple sources familiar with the arrangement.

More broadly, neither the general economic crisis nor international sanctions appear to have had any significant effect on the Tatmadaw’s capacity to wage war. On the contrary, resource-intensive operations like airstrikes have steadily increased throughout the conflict and the Tatmadaw continues to field new and advanced weapons, including airburst munitions, precision-guided bombs, UAVs and counter-UAV systems. There is little reason to expect that international stakeholders opposed to the 2021 coup are either capable or willing to exert the kind of pressure needed to shape the Tatmadaw’s behaviour, especially following the United States’ removal of sanctions against several junta-linked entities in July 2025. The current tempo of battlefield operations suggests that the army maintains sufficient levels of firepower and that its defence industry does not appear to have been critically disrupted by the 28 March 2025 earthquake.

Instead, the Tatmadaw’s largest remaining internal challenge appears to be the disastrous leadership of its commander-in-chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Institutional dissatisfaction with Min Aung Hlaing remains, and his poor decision-making still poses a potential risk to the army’s operational effectiveness and internal order. However, the army’s broader institutional coherence and indefatigable willingness to wage war at any cost seem to have somewhat tempered such concerns. Sources close to the Tatmadaw say that internal dynamics have stabilised in 2025 ahead of an anticipated leadership transition, which is expected to follow upcoming general elections that are scheduled to begin in stages on 28 December 2025.

The Tatmadaw’s improved force posture and other reforms have enabled several important reversals against opposition forces. The most significant of these was the recapture of Nawnghkio Town in Shan State from the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) around 13 July. This turnaround came shortly after the Tatmadaw regained control of Lashio, the administrative seat of Shan State, through a negotiated settlement with the TNLA’s ally, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Tatmadaw forces have also made progress against the TNLA in the area north of Mandalay, reducing pressure on the city. Together, these advances are not only a major propaganda win for the Tatmadaw following years of embarrassing defeats, but also make it possible for the Tatmadaw to launch a three-pronged offensive into the TNLA’s core territory centred on the Palaung Self-Administered Zone, potentially reversing some of the worst losses incurred by Operation 1027.

Further to the northwest, a Tatmadaw counter-offensive against the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has also made significant progress around the resource-rich township of Hpakant, Kachin State. The Tatmadaw has recaptured several mines, robbing the KIA of vital revenue streams. It has also fiercely resisted the KIA’s siege of Bhamo, which began in December 2024, inflicting hundreds of casualties against the KIA. After reinforcing the city, the Tatmadaw recaptured the 366th Artillery Battalion HQ on 5 August, indicating a shift in the direction of the battle.

In the southeast, the Tatmadaw continues to beat back the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) and its allies, recapturing the key towns of Moebye in early July and Demoso in August. The Tatmadaw now firmly controls the main transport corridors and urban centres in Kayah State, as well as the state border with southern Shan State.

In western Myanmar, the Tatmadaw appears to have halted the Arakan Army’s (AA) incursion into the Magway and Bago regions, though its own efforts to cross the mountains and re-enter Rakhine State have also stalled or at least slowed. Preventing further AA inroads into central Myanmar is of vital importance for the Tatmadaw, as this area is a key recruiting ground and the site of its military-industrial base. After instituting mandatory military service for adults in March 2025, in May 2025 the AA banned men and women from leaving Rakhine. The move indicates that the AA is also facing personnel constraints and is likely concerned about a future Tatmadaw counter-offensive through the mountains or from the regime-controlled state capital of Sittwe on the coast.

While the Tatmadaw’s operational resurgence is evident in some areas, it does not point towards a near-term restoration of territorial or administrative control to pre-2021 levels, as the army and junta still face serious constraints and formidable opposition. In April, for example, a fresh offensive against the town of Kawkareik by the Karen National Liberation Army inflicted losses on the Tatmadaw and obstructed traffic along the main trade corridor between Myanmar and Thailand. Although the Tatmadaw had regained control of part of the highway by late July, its grip along the Thailand–Myanmar border continues to slip.

Instead, the Tatmadaw’s partial recovery demonstrates its continued potency and suggests that it no longer faces a near-term risk of definitive defeat on the battlefield or institutional collapse. It also underscores how difficult it is for opposition forces to consolidate control over captured territories, especially areas far from the country’s borders.

Sovereignty supplanted

As a result of the 2021 coup, instability in Myanmar has exceeded a tolerable threshold for regional stakeholders, given the enormous outflows of people and the rapid proliferation of transnational threats like cyber scamming. These trends have drawn key actors like China and Thailand further into Myanmar, but mainly in pursuit of acceptable levels of stability rather than more comprehensive solutions.

A common refrain is that China’s involvement in Myanmar is driven by an ambition to secure large-scale economic interests and a strategic corridor that links its landlocked province of Yunnan to the Andaman Sea, thereby bypassing the maritime chokepoint at the Malacca Strait. According to this narrative, China plays both sides of the conflict in Myanmar to further its economic and geostrategic goals. However, this notion requires scrutiny, as such policies would be counterproductive to both long-term economic investment and the creation of a stable strategic corridor across Myanmar. To the contrary, the meaningful realisation of these would require a nationwide decline in violence (as opposed to only in border areas) and a degree of political stability far broader than what China’s policies are designed to facilitate.

Rather than being driven by a single grand strategy, Beijing’s involvement in Myanmar appears more limited and reactive, reflecting its assessment that the conflict will continue indefinitely. Accordingly, China’s approach has been to shield itself from the chaos next door and ensure that only its most vital interests are upheld. This disposition has manifested itself in two key ways: firstly, through efforts to establish a buffer zone of influence by supporting ethnic proxy forces along the border; and secondly, by maintaining the balance of power between those buffer forces and the central authority (currently controlled by the Tatmadaw) so that neither side can overcome the other, which might lead to unexpected and unmanageable outcomes.

This dual approach has been most visible in China’s response to the rise of the cyber-scamming industry in Myanmar. To address the problem, some elements of the Chinese security establishment supported the Brotherhood Alliance, which includes the MNDAA, TNLA and AA, in launching Operation 1027in October 2023. Though it branded the offensive as a fight against scammers, the Brotherhood went much further by seizing large swathes of territory from the regime and cooperating with other anti-junta forces. Inspired by this success, opposition actors across the country launched fresh assaults, pushing the Tatmadaw to its weakest point in decades.

Suddenly confronted with the possibility of regime collapse, China has since sought to restore the balance of power by reining in the Brotherhood and propping up the Tatmadaw with weapons and finance. It has then sought to create a new operational equilibrium by mediating ceasefires between the Tatmadaw and northern EAOs. Major progress towards this goal was achieved in April 2025, when the MNDAA handed back control of Lashio to the Tatmadaw in a deal brokered and monitored by Beijing. The MNDAA in return received de facto recognition for an area along the border much larger than that which it had originally sought to reclaim.

The MNDAA’s deal with the Tatmadaw carries at least two significant implications for the conflict and Myanmar’s political future. Firstly, the bargain has eroded trust between some EAOs and the broader People’s Defence Force (PDF) movement. To attract volunteer fighters from the PDFs, the MNDAA co-opted the language of popular revolution by vowing to overthrow the regime, but then promptly betrayed the cause by striking a bargain with the Tatmadaw. This behaviour lends credence to the impression that the EAOs are exploiting young revolutionaries, especially those from the Bamar, for their own narrow aims. The MNDAA also violated the core tenet of the Brotherhood, which is that political bargaining must be collective. Should the Tatmadaw launch a wider offensive against the TNLA, the MNDAA will face a choice of either assisting its ally or upholding the ceasefire.

Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, the MNDAA arrangement provides a workable model through which both Beijing and northern EAOs can secure their interests through negotiations with the Tatmadaw, albeit at great cost to the country’s autonomy and political future. For one, the arrangement requires Beijing’s indirect enforcement, which creates external dependencies for both sides. It also shows that EAOs can trade conquered territories for recognition of authority over areas more core to their interests, re-subjecting local populations to Tatmadaw control. Should similar deals with other actors take shape, evidence shows that non-inclusive ceasefires will prolong the conflict by freeing up the Tatmadaw to wage offensives elsewhere. They will also reduce the collective bargaining power of opposition forces that is needed for a political transition away from military rule.

Recent developments have also shifted how Thailand approaches the conflict. According to interviews with senior officials in Bangkok, Chinese diplomats have encouraged Thailand to replicate the Lashio model in southeast Myanmar. Within Thai policy circles, there has long been a debate over whether Thailand should support the Karen National Union (KNU) to consolidate its control, thereby creating enough leverage to force the Tatmadaw into a deal that stabilises the border area. While it is unclear how much support this policy has, the KNU’s expanding control of the border makes the plan more plausible.

Since the 2021 coup, Thai stakeholders have often framed the crisis in Myanmar around the issues of migration, drugs and economic disruption. More recently, security and political officials in Bangkok, as well as the Thai public, have expressed concern over the ways in which the crisis in Myanmar has enabled China to expand its security footprint across the region. The growing scam industry is of particular concern, as pressure to combat it paves the way for increasingly bold interventions by Beijing. In addition, some military officials in Thailand are worried about the continued territorial expansion of those groups close to China, especially the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which continues to facilitate the flow of narcotics into northern Thailand. These dynamics harken back to the Cold War, when geopolitical competition played a greater role in Myanmar than today, and threaten to drive the conflict in unexpected ways.

Revolution adrift

The popular resistance movement that emerged in response to the 2021 coup, sometimes referred to as the Spring Revolution, seeks the removal of the military from politics, the restoration of democracy and the formation of a federal union as a lasting solution to the country’s decades-long civil war between central authorities and ethnic forces seeking greater autonomy. Implicit in these aims are the pursuit of human rights, ethnic equality, civil liberties and the demilitarisation of society and politics. Despite battlefield progress against the Tatmadaw, protracted violence has transformed the country in ways that put such ideological aims increasingly out of reach.

To begin with, the groups that are most responsible for weakening the regime and in control of the most territory were already engaged in armed struggles before the coup, and their motivations for fighting are not always aligned with those of the Spring Revolution. Powerful groups like the AA and MNDAA, for example, seek neither democracy nor federalism. Instead, they have committed abuses while acting in a highly autonomous and autocratic fashion.

Now in control of most of Rakhine, the AA remains aloof from the NUG and has explicitly stated on multiple occasions that it seeks a confederal, rather than federal arrangement. The group has attacked the Rohingya and through its repressive policies has helped drive 150,000 Rohingya civilians across the border into Bangladesh over the last 18 months. This behaviour has directly played into the Tatmadaw’s hands by helping to stoke a new Rohingya insurgency, which is likely to endure even if the regime falls. The AA tightly controls the local press, has a history of threatening civil-society groups that criticise it and is currently in the process of militarising Rakhine society through mandatory conscription (including through abduction) and the formation of village militias.

To keep the junta at bay and secure its long supply lines, the AA has sought the creation of a buffer space outside the Rakhine homeland and provided support to proxy forces across the country. This strategy has directly fuelled an intensifying conflict between the Chin Brotherhood and Chinland Council, two rival factions that oppose the regime. Even before the 2021 coup, the AA was accused of carrying out abuses and forced displacement in Paletwa Township, Chin State, which it now controls. Within some Chin resistance circles, there is a quiet acceptance that, if and when the Tatmadaw is defeated, it will then be necessary to expel the AA from Chin State. The strategy of pursuing buffer zones is not unique to the AA and is likely to drive inter-group tensions across the country.

After capturing a large portion of northern Shan State, the MNDAA has also ruled with a firm grip, restricting internet access, shooting protestors, conscripting children and executing prisoners in public. The MNDAA has sought to re-engineer the demographics of its territory by expelling or restricting the movement of Bamar, and reporting has revealed how the group has rapidly sold off land and assets, including those that belong to displaced persons, to Chinese business interests. Nearby, the TNLA has asserted its dominance over other ethnic groups through displays of cultural hegemony and the appropriation of local resources in a pattern that strongly mirrors the process of ‘Burmanisation’. The TNLA’s rapid expansion has led to conflicts with other EAOs, including the KIA and the Shan State Progress Party.

Such dynamics are neither isolated nor uncommon. Across the country, cycles of violence and retribution have given rise to new grievances and patterns of conflict, pushing the armed struggle increasingly further from its original logic. One of the most concerning trends is the proliferation and intensification of conflict between opposition forces and actors other than the Tatmadaw. Groups like the Pa-O National Army, the Shanni Nationalities Army and hundreds of localised militias known as Pyu Saw Htee are engaged in bitter and localised struggles against various resistance actors. To acquire their support, the Tatmadaw has given some of these groups wildly favourable concessions, including access to arms and advanced training, allowing them to amass a level of unchecked autonomy that no future government would likely tolerate. Conflicts involving these groups will almost certainly continue or even intensify if the regime collapses and leaves a major security vacuum.

National disunity

Despite its initial promise, the NUG has proven unable to forge a united coalition or secure commitment to a future political vision shared by a critical mass of stakeholders. To be fair, the NUG does not hold all the responsibility for this outcome, given that many of the country’s most powerful EAOs, including the UWSA, the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), the MNDAA and the AA have never shown genuine willingness to join in a collective political process since the coup. Such groups occupy highly strategic territories and dominate the weapons supply, making it improbable that a future peace settlement can be reached without their buy-in, or at least acquiescence.

Instead, the NUG has naturally gravitated towards those groups that are more supportive of federalism and democracy, at least in principle. This includes the KNU, the Karenni coalition, the KIA and the Chin National Front (CNF) in a bloc previously referred to as K3C. 1 The most powerful of these groups, the KIA, distanced itself politically from the NUG as early as 2022. Though it supposedly agreed to take part in a centralised command mechanism, the KIA never allowed the NUG oversight of the Kachin-PDF, which it fully controls and deploys for its own purposes.

The KIA’s departure from the alliance left the NUG with just three ethnic allies, now referred to as the K2C. Though the KNU enjoys strong domestic and international standing, it struggles with its own internal divisions and cannot compare militarily with the northern EAOs, largely because it does not have access to the same conflict economies and weapons markets that exist near the border with China. The Karenni resistance operates in the smallest state, where less than 0.5% of the country’s population reside, while the CNF fights in Chin State, the least strategically vital theatre in Myanmar. As mentioned, the Karenni are currently losing ground, and the CNF’s legitimacy is heavily contested by the Chin Brotherhood. Together, these groups’ political and military weight is painfully limited.

Moreover, the political cohesion of the K2C remains in serious doubt. Following the 28 March earthquake that devastated swathes of central Myanmar, the NUG announced a pause in fighting to facilitate rescue and recovery. Rather than echo this call, the KNU, the Karenni and the CNF all launched fresh assaults, contributing to an overall environment of hostility in the aftermath of the earthquake. This disparate behaviour during a dire national emergency is an alarming indication of the extent to which opposition interests diverge. There is little reason to believe that such political and social disunity would suddenly be overcome if Myanmar were thrust into an even more severe and acute crisis, such as one precipitated by the collapse of the central state.

Perhaps because it understood the problem of relying on EAOs, since its inception the NUG has sought to develop its own military strength on a par with other opposition actors. But this strategy has failed for two predictable reasons. Firstly, EAOs remain in control of the largest and most lucrative conflict economies, which are needed to finance military operations, let alone parallel governance, leaving the NUG reliant on an ever-shrinking supply of public donations. Secondly, the NUG still cannot access adequate firepower, as the critical weapons markets are also controlled by EAOs that prioritise their own force postures. The NUG’s inability to provide sufficient finances or weapons is the primary reason it has never achieved meaningful command and control over its forces, even if in theory they remain subordinate.

While the PDF movement poses a serious security challenge for the Tatmadaw, without the NUG’s centralised command it remains highly fragmented, uncoordinated and incapable of replicating the territorial gains won by EAOs. This trend is likely to worsen as more PDFs disassociate themselves from the NUG and finance their operations through alternative and potentially exploitative means, in turn bypassing the problem of declining donations and further reducing their accountability to the public. Allegiances to the NUG will also be tested when the NUG’s mandate, based on the National League for Democracy’s (NLD) 2020 election victory, expires at the end of 2025, opening the way for new Bamar leaders to assert themselves.

The limits of armed rebellion

The Tatmadaw’s seizure of power in 2021 reversed the social and economic progress of the previous era and catapulted the country into a period of unmitigated crisis. In responding to the opposition it incited, the Tatmadaw has committed dozens of massacres against civilians, razed tens of thousands of homes, destroyed swathes of cropland and livestock, blockaded essential supplies of medicine and food, bombed hospitals and schools, and forced hundreds of thousands of people, if not millions, to flee the country. This behaviour has stoked a degree of hatred and grievance so intense that it is likely to endure for decades.

The Tatmadaw’s brutality and appetite for violence, however, is a fundamental pillar of both its historical and contemporary hold on power. As the conflict record in Myanmar shows, the army’s collective punishment and violence against civilians is an effective way to tire the population and erode support for armed rebellion. Though it is difficult to measure, conflict fatigue has been visible in Myanmar for some time, evidenced by the practice of forced recruitment by opposition groups, continued outward migration, declining donations to the revolution, the collapse of resistance in urban areas and a general rise in public criticism of resistance actors.

A second reality is that confronting the Tatmadaw’s brutality compels opposition forces to also adopt ruthless tactics, militarise their own communities and engage in perverse and abusive behaviour. Over time, the fundamental principles or objectives of a revolutionary movement are put at risk by such actions. New antagonistic interactions take shape when armed actors compete with one another or are implicated in excesses and illicit conflict economies, further stoking violence and public discontent. In Myanmar, these pressures, among others, have historically led to splits in nearly every armed movement, degrading the overall potency of opposition forces and allowing the Tatmadaw to survive.

Given its insular nature, the Tatmadaw remains poorly understood and there is a general tendency to project external rationales onto it. 2 This has led to false impressions about what type of pressure could shape the army’s behaviour. Though current levels of resistance are untenable, a constant state of violence and instability is normal for the Tatmadaw, and in fact provides the raison d’être for the army’s involvement in all aspects of Myanmar society. The Tatmadaw does not tire of fighting and will not bend to demands based on threats to peripheral interests, such as the economy or its domestic and international reputation. An even-greater dilemma is that inflicting major battlefield losses on the Tatmadaw has only served to deepen the army’s siege mentality, vindictiveness and resolve.

Taken together, these trends suggest that defeating the Tatmadaw through armed violence would most likely require a comprehensive and crushing victory on the battlefield across the country all at once, ensuring that those losses are irreversible. No opposition force or alliance has ever come remotely near to achieving such a victory in the last eight decades.

Stalemate scenarios

Scenario One: Protracted and severe violence

Scenario One entails the continuation of armed conflict and violence at a scale and intensity similar to that witnessed across the past four years. On the battlefield, the Tatmadaw could continue to expand its control over vital logistics routes and achieve incremental gains against opponents in certain priority theatres. It may overcome some less powerful PDFs or restrict the operational reach of smaller EAOs. More powerful EAOs would probably maintain their ability to wage large-scale attacks, leading to shifts in territorial control through repeated cycles of offensive and counter-offensive.

The Tatmadaw will almost certainly retain its ability to hold the country hostage through blockades, airstrikes and its grip on the state machinery, precluding any return to ‘normalcy’ in liberated areas, let alone economic and social progress. While the EAOs could further develop their parallel governance systems, what they can offer as non-state armed groups in a wartime environment will always be limited. It is highly unlikely that EAOs will receive recognition from either the centre or neighbouring countries in the absence of a deal to end the fighting, rendering it difficult if not impossible to attract large-scale investment in modern infrastructure or formalised international trade. Access to better jobs, reliable internet and electricity, higher education or secondary and tertiary healthcare will remain out of reach for most people, especially those living outside of regime-controlled cities. Instead, life in liberated areas will be largely defined by precarious subsistence living until the conflict is resolved.

The human costs of war will continue to mount. Based on the trends seen in the past four years, tens of thousands more will likely die or face injury from armed violence. The countryside will become increasingly contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance, posing a grave threat to future generations. Small arms will continue to proliferate across communities, ensuring a disarmament nightmare for any future government. Conflict will drive continued internal displacement as well as mass migration out of the country, especially among the country’s educated and youth, and nearly twenty million people will face food insecurity and economic destitution.

If the current trend continues, the prolonged violence will worsen social-political fragmentation and stoke conflicts that are detached from the current struggle against the Tatmadaw; some of these conflicts will take on communal or ethnic dimensions. In the unlikely event that the Tatmadaw is decisively defeated on the battlefield or collapses due to internal pressures, it is unclear whether any single actor or coalition could control the centre (let alone periphery), and so a major security vacuum will probably emerge. Powerful armed groups, especially those close to China, could move to rapidly expand control, resulting in unabated, albeit different, patterns of violence, militarisation and authoritarian rule.

But if the Tatmadaw survives, and unified opposition to it continues to erode, resistance groups could be forced into a self-help dilemma whereby the activities and arrangements necessary for survival will contradict or threaten the interests of other groups. Avenues for compromise and cooperation beyond the battlefield will narrow and competing or irreconcilable visions of Myanmar’s political future will continue to proliferate. Conflict economies will become entrenched across the country, new grievances will be continuously generated and pathways to peace, formal economic development and national cohesion will dissipate.

Scenario Two: Partial or non-inclusive ceasefires

Scenario Two depicts the possibility that mounting pressure from neighbouring countries, conflict fatigue, factionalism and the Tatmadaw’s military resurgence will force some opposition groups into seeking informal or de facto ceasefires. In this scenario, the Tatmadaw could offer these groups relief from airstrikes and blockades in exchange for a halt to active armed resistance. This would allow for some return to social-political normalcy and marked improvements to daily life in certain areas. However, the conditions for a durable peace are unlikely to be met if armed resistance and abuses by the Tatmadaw continue elsewhere in the country, making it politically difficult for any one group to engage in formal dialogue with the junta. Ceasefires could also fall apart once the Tatmadaw begins suppressing opponents elsewhere, allowing it to renew pressure on the groups it previously agreed to ceasefires with.

In the event that a more formal but non-inclusive ceasefire bargain is reached – resembling the deal between the Tatmadaw and the MNDAA – the neighbouring country, be it Bangladesh, China, India or Thailand, could extend greater recognition to that opposition group, which would in turn encourage investment and limited development of cross-border infrastructure such as electricity and internet, as well as semi-formal trade and finance systems. In this scenario, a militarised one-party statelet capable of offering stability and development could emerge. As is the case with Wa State, this entity would become autonomous but also dependent on the neighbouring country, rendering its reintegration back into the Myanmar polity exceedingly difficult and unlikely.

The emergence of non-inclusive or bilateral ceasefires would almost certainly lead to escalation in non-ceasefire areas as the Tatmadaw redirects its resources against opponents that continue to resist. The brunt of this campaign would likely be felt by PDFs and their supporters in central Myanmar, especially if they lose access to borderland weapons markets and EAO support because of ceasefire deals. Many of the dynamics described in Scenario One would be present in areas with active armed conflict, and the prospects for nationwide economic development would be dim.

This outcome could lead to a situation resembling the post-1988 conflict landscape. Following the consolidation of ceasefires in northern frontiers throughout the 1990s, the Tatmadaw made significant progress in pacifying other parts of the country. After two decades of counter-insurgency campaigns, the Tatmadaw introduced a new constitution and initiated a transition towards quasi-democracy from a position of unrivalled military strength. However, the Tatmadaw, and later the NLD government, struggled to integrate areas covered by earlier ceasefire arrangements into their peace- and nation-building processes, helping to stoke renewed rebellions.

Scenario Three: Simultaneous or inclusive ceasefires

Scenario Three depicts a critical mass of opposition stakeholders simultaneously seeking ceasefires with the Tatmadaw, resulting in an overall decline in armed violence across the country. These arrangements could be formal, informal or de facto and arise through a variation of disconnected negotiation tracks, some facilitated by external actors. In this case, a broad conflict de-escalation would emerge as the sum of disparate processes, but there would be no umbrella or all-inclusive track for negotiation. This development would make it hard to facilitate all-inclusive follow-up negotiations over a national political solution, which ideally would require a wider buy-in from domestic stakeholders.

A broad set of stakeholders could also seek conflict de-escalation via a single track at the same time. This seems improbable in the near term for two reasons. Firstly, as demonstrated above, different opposition stakeholders have contrasting, if not asymmetrical, interests and face widely diverging political and battlefield realities. Most opposition forces remain reluctant to engage the Tatmadaw in dialogue or give up fighting, and so as of mid-2025 the conflict is not yet ripe for inclusive ceasefire negotiations. This calculus could change if the Tatmadaw regains a dominant position on the battlefield (which could take years) and opposition groups are forced to negotiate from a heavily weakened position.

A second obstacle is the Tatmadaw’s insistence that opposition forces pursue negotiations through pre-existing channels, such as those established during the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) peace process between 2011–21. Presently, re-engaging in arrangements from the previous era is politically unfeasible for most, if not all, opposition stakeholders. Armed actors could alternatively engage the Tatmadaw informally or through intermediaries, but this may again lead to staggered and disparate tracks that would be hard to synchronise or combine. Otherwise, there is currently no viable venue or platform that a critical mass of actors could use for genuinely inclusive talks. For example, Beijing’s ‘Kunming Process’ has not sought to incorporate PDFs or southern EAOs, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has so far proven unable to bring the northern EAOs into its talks. It is also highly unlikely that the Tatmadaw would accept an ASEAN-led mediation in a distant capital.

One avenue a broad set of stakeholders might potentially agree to is a Bangkok-led track. This could first bring together northern EAOs, southern EAOs, the NUG and certain PDFs to negotiate among themselves before eventually meeting with the Tatmadaw. However, efforts to get this track off the ground have been complicated by Thailand’s own political divisions and complex relations with other ASEAN member states. If a ‘Bangkok Process’ emerges, northern EAOs would probably seek some form of approval from China before attending. ASEAN would therefore also need to secure Beijing’s buy-in, but at present it is unclear if ASEAN diplomats regularly coordinate with their Chinese counterparts on Myanmar. Moreover, ASEAN would need to re-envision or amend the Five-Point Consensus, the bloc’s road map to solve the Myanmar crisis, in such a way that allows the diplomatic centre of gravity to shift towards Thailand and China, an outcome that seems unlikely at least for now.

For its part, the Tatmadaw could possibly accept Bangkok as a negotiation venue given its close relationship with Thai stakeholders and their influence over key actors like the NUG and KNU. But any negotiation in Bangkok would still require enormous diplomatic efforts by China, Thailand and ASEAN, and it is not clear if or at what point the Tatmadaw would accept international mediation, regardless of location, for all-inclusive dialogue. The Tatmadaw appears to maintain that groups should individually reach out for dialogue before joining a wider process (which it may intend to model on the NCA). Even the Kunming Process devolved into separate bilateral negotiations after initial meetings between the Tatmadaw and all three Brotherhood groups, underscoring how difficult it is to host multi-stakeholder discussions.

This demonstrates the further challenge of connecting or ‘coupling’ any negotiated ceasefires with inclusive post-conflict political dialogues. Before agreeing to a ceasefire, some stakeholders may want a commitment to certain political outcomes or processes, at least in principle. However, it will be exceedingly difficult to agree on a political agenda for discussion while fighting continues, especially since opposition groups still have no shared vision of an ideal political solution. Agreeing to ceasefires without a clear idea of what comes next may therefore be necessary. At the very least, this option could arrest some of the negative trends described in Scenarios One and Two. But how any ceasefire could then translate into an all-inclusive political dialogue aimed at finding a lasting solution to the conflict remains unclear.

Morgan Michaels is a Research Fellow for Southeast Asian Security and Defence. He leads the production and development of the Myanmar Conflict Map.