China pressures Myanmar opposition groups to halt latest offensive

The Brotherhood Alliance, a powerful bloc of three ethnic armies, launched a fresh offensive across parts of northern Shan State, marking the end of a short-lived ceasefire brokered by China in January. Called the Haigeng Agreement, the deal halted Operation 1027, a surprise blitz that succeeded in expelling the regime from large areas along the Myanmar—China border. The renewed assault is being called Operation 1027 Part II.

The latest offensive appears to be an attempt to secure a buffer between the Brotherhood’s newly acquired territories and the regime’s stronghold in central Myanmar. The alliance’s initial attacks — carried out by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) — which began on 24 June, have also sought to capture a key corridor used for funnelling arms to opposition groups fighting elsewhere, including the Arakan Army (AA), another alliance member. The operation involves significant participation from some People’s Defence Force (PDF) units operating under the TNLA’s command, which have been tasked with pressuring the regime-held city of Mandalay.

On 3 July, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the third member of the alliance, initiated a siege of Lashio, the largest town and commercial hub of northern Shan State. The heavily guarded city is home to the Northeastern Command and is the regime’s last major foothold in the theatre. The fall of Lashio would greatly compromise the regime’s ability to maintain any presence in northern Shan State or resecure access to the Myanmar—China border in the foreseeable future.

Despite the continuity in name, the conditions defining Operation 1027 Part II are markedly different than those that catalysed the spectacular losses suffered by the military between November 2023 and March 2024. While it is believed to have greenlit the initial offensive last year, China appears firmly opposed to the latest round of fighting. The Brotherhood’s continued expansion has also led to tensions with other armed groups, two of which have stepped in to prevent the further spread of violence in northern Shan State.

A closing window of opportunity

Following the onset of Operation 1027 in northern Shan, the regime suffered a cascade of losses across Sagaing, Kayin, Kayah, Kachin and Rakhine. But eight months later, there are signs that the regime is beginning to regroup. By June, the army had halted offensives in Sagaing and Kayin, and has now recaptured most of Loikaw, the Kayah State capital. The Kachin Independence Army’s (KIA) offensive has stalled, while the AA’s advance has been slowed by the regime’s use of divide and rule tactics tactics in Rakhine.

With the first batch of conscripts already graduated, the regime is on track to field at least 15,000 new soldiers by the end of 2024. Most of these recruits either volunteered or received inducements to join, meaning that the junta initially avoided more coercive forms of conscription. 1 Moreover, these figures do not include what may be tens of thousands of fighters who have joined pro-regime militias across the country, many of which are now receiving better arms and training directly from the military.

In the last six months, the regime has made notable progress in the acquisition and deployment of commercial and military uninhabited aerial vehicles, posing new challenges for opposition forces. Despite an initial string of aircraft losses in early 2024, the air force has managed to keep its fleet operational, leading to a record number of monthly airstrikes. Meanwhile, the regime’s Directorate of Defence Industries has kept up with the army and air force’s demand for munitions, at its highest level since the Second World War.

Though it continues to face incremental losses on several fronts, the military maintains considerable capacity to wage war and is not in a state of freefall decline. Should the regime’s recruitment and weaponisation drives continue to make progress, or should key opposition actors miscalculate or lose momentum owing to their own limitations, then the regime might manage to reverse some losses beginning next year. In this scenario, the Brotherhood Alliance faces a limited window in which to consolidate its hard-won gains.

Fearing a collapse, China lends a hand to the regime

China’s support for the Brotherhood Alliance was a significant contributing factor in the initial success of Operation 1027. The city of Laukkaing, captured by the MNDAA in January, was a hub for human-trafficking and cyber-scam operations targeting Chinese nationals. By mid-2023, the criminality along the border had become a salient domestic issue in China, drawing the attention and ire of Beijing. After vowing to eradicate the scam centres, the MNDAA was given a greenlight to overthrow the regime-aligned Kokang Border Guard Force, which controlled Laukkaing and the surrounding area known as Special Region 1. China facilitated the fall of Laukkaing by closing its border and blocking resupplies to the city, whose defenders were then besieged by the MNDAA.

Operation 1027 quickly spiralled into something far greater than what Beijing had likely anticipated. Initially, the TNLA played a supporting role to the MNDAA by severing the highway and blocking the regime’s reinforcements. But once the military began to retreat, the TNLA moved to conquer vast territories in what Chinese officials probably saw as a violation of the unspoken arrangement. Operation 1027 then catalysed other opposition offensives across the country, leaving the military weaker than at any point in the post-independence era. Officials in Yunnan and Beijing were suddenly confronted with the possibility of a total regime collapse on their border. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, China stepped in to halt the offensive by brokering the 11 January ceasefire.

Since hitting a low point in early 2024, relations between China and the junta have steadily improved. According to various intermediary sources, this rapprochement was made possible by the regime’s willingness to satisfy Chinese demands, as well as a fear within the Chinese government that the regime could collapse, leading to chaos. Recent diplomatic activity is indicative of the improving relations between both sides. On 29 June, Foreign Minister Wang Yi received former Myanmar president Thein Sein in Beijing. Between 8 and 9 July, Deputy Commander-in-Chief General Soe Win attended the Green Development Forum of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Qingdao, making a stop in Kunming along the way. On 21 July, junta Foreign Minister Than Swe flew to Kunming to attend a trade fair. Following the first two visits, media reported that China plans to deliver a major weapons shipment to the regime.

Authorities in China have responded negatively to the Brotherhood’s resumption of Operation 1027. In the weeks preceding the TNLA’s renewed assault, China began restricting cross-border trade to areas under the group’s control, leading to shortages in fuel. Immediately after the MNDAA shelled Lashio on 3 July, authorities in Yunnan cut power to Laukkaing. The next day, water and internet services were also suspended. On 9 July, authorities closed the border gate outside of the city. According to Shwe Phee Myay News Agency, trade at all border gates controlled by the MNDAA and TNLA is now suspended, and sources indicated that wounded MNDAA soldiers have been blocked from accessing hospitals on the Chinese side. On 14 July, regime aircraft bombed Laukkaing. Sources said that military officials informed their counterparts in China before the attack.

Opposition competition accelerates

All three members of the Brotherhood Alliance have sought to consolidate their authority in newly captured territories. This has entailed the implementation of new policies on issues like taxation, conscription and ethnic language schooling, but it has also involved efforts to reengineer the social demographics of certain areas. After seizing Laukkaing, the MNDAA demolished the Bamar quarter of the city and barred its residents from returning. Since the coup, the TNLA has relocated thousands of Ta’ang civilians away from their hilltop villages and into lowland areas it seeks to control. Similarly, the AA has forcibly displaced the Rohingya and stands accused of repopulating empty Chin villages with ethnic Rakhine people. These behaviours have led to disputes with other stakeholders, including ethnic armed organisations (EAOs).

In addition to ethnic issues, growing competition among armed actors is driven by strategic imperatives, including the need to control lucrative resources, border crossings and corridors that the regime could utilise in a future counter-offensive. A primary objective of the TNLA’s renewed operation is the capture of the Mogoke and possibly Mongmit townships. As the largest source of rubies in the world, the Mogoke Valley is an important revenue-generating site for nearly every armed actor in northern Shan State. The area also lies at the junction of key routes used for smuggling weapons and narcotics produced or sourced along the Myanmar–China border. Which group controls this area will matter for those seeking to profit from these trades, and it could also influence the trajectory of the wider war by determining which opposition outfits are able to receive weapons.

The TNLA’s renewed offensive is as much about seizing territory before others can as it is about countering the regime. Key parts of northern Shan State captured by the alliance are home to sizeable Kachin communities and, as such, are part of what the KIA considers to be ‘Kachin sub-state’. During Operation 1027, the TNLA poured considerable resources into capturing Namhkam, a town situated at the borders of Shan, Kachin and China’s Yunnan Province. The area is the main accessway linking the KIA’s operational zones in Kachin and Shan and could also be used by the regime in a future counter-offensive against the Brotherhood. After witnessing the TNLA’s advance, the KIA launched an urgent bid to secure its access to Kachin, deploying every available unit to capture the vital towns of Manweinggyi and Nam Phat Kar in January. It has also made repeated attempts to ensure access to the Mogoke Valley, including with renewed assaults in Mongmit. Further gains by the KIA could limit the TNLA’s ability to fulfil its territorial ambitions, and vice versa.

Inter-group contest in the aftermath of the regime’s retreat is not unique to northern Shan State. Over the last several months, the AA has sent fighters on multiple occasions to assist the Chin Brotherhood, an alliance of anti-regime groups operating in Chin State. Under severe blockade in Rakhine, the AA has long sought to open an alternative supply route via southern Chin. The pursuit of this objective has stoked suspicion among some Chin stakeholders that the AA plans to secure a buffer zone at their expense. It has also indirectly fuelled violent conflict between the Chin Brotherhood and the rival Chinland Council led by the Chin National Front (CNF), a close National Unity Government (NUG) ally. In June, the AA directly clashed with CNF fighters for the first time as it assisted its partners in the capture of Matupi.

Lashio siege invites third-party intervention

Neither the TNLA nor MNDAA hold any historical claim to the city of Lashio, which is home to a large Shan population. Over the last decade, the city has also served as a haven for civilians of all ethnicities seeking shelter from violence and EAO forced recruitment drives, which accelerated after Operation 1027. As with the initial offensive, Operation 1027 Part II risks aggravating portions of the state’s population that may not support the Brotherhood’s continued expansion into disputed areas.

In a sign of these tensions, clashes have erupted between the TNLA and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), which until 2022 had remained close allies in their war against another EAO, the Restoration Council of Shan State. The TNLA has accused the SSPP of disrupting its operations and assisting the regime, while the SSPP has vowed to protect Shan populations.

At the behest of China and invitation of the regime, on 12 July the United Wa State Army (UWSA) deployed a 2,000-strong force in Tangyan Township, where the MNDAA had begun to encroach. Similarly, the SSPP sent fighters to the nearby town of Mongyai in what it explicitly described as an effort to prevent others from seizing the area. The regime’s garrisons have remained in both instances, indicating that the UWSA and SSPP fighters are there to serve as a buffer force. To appease China, the MNDAA and TNLA announced a four-day unilateral ceasefire in northern Shan State on 14 July, followed by another ceasefire from 19 to 31 July. Despite the declarations, the MNDAA has accelerated ground and artillery attacks on Lashio. Whether the group will submit to China’s pressure remains to be seen.

The UWSA has tried to mediate the dispute between the TNLA and SSPP, hosting the two sides for talks in Panghsang on 13 July, which reportedly went well. The UWSA’s intervention could help prevent an immediate escalation, but a lasting solution may be hard to come by if the TNLA and MNDAA continue to push into areas claimed by other EAOs. As the current episode demonstrates, an escalation between major EAOs could reshape the wider conflict landscape in sudden and unpredictable ways. The RCSS, for example, has already begun to mobilise towards the disputed areas. Inter-EAO conflict would also open opportunities for the military, which in the past has provided intelligence and air support to Shan forces fighting its opponents.

Though it could help guard against future regime attacks, the Brotherhood’s buffer strategy risks leaving it isolated from both China and other EAOs. This reality may partially explain what appears to be a heightened level of coordination between the Brotherhood and the NUG. Although the NUG Ministry of Defence had no foreknowledge of Operation 1027, sources indicated that it had some involvement in the latest offensive. Since the coup, members of the Brotherhood Alliance have co-opted slogans about federal democracy to garner popular support, despite pursuing alternative governance models. Similarly, closer partnership with the NUG, whose stated goal is national liberation, provides the Brotherhood with a political justification for its expansion into areas claimed by other groups.