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Is the Brotherhood headed to Mandalay?

The recent fall of Lashio has placed the Myanmar military in its most vulnerable position since the 2021 coup. Unable to mount a meaningful counter-offensive, the regime’s core territory now lies exposed to the threat of direct attack by the Brotherhood Alliance and its partners.

By Morgan Michaels
Graphics by Anton Dzeviatau
Published October 2024

Mandalay Palace at night, 1 February 2015. (Photo: Alamy)

On 5 August fighters from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) overran the Northeastern Command, granting them control of Lashio, the administrative seat of northern Shan State. The seizure of the city is a milestone for the Brotherhood Alliance, a powerful bloc of ethnic armies that includes the MNDAA. Beyond the capture of remote bases and small towns along the Myanmar–China border, the Brotherhood has now demonstrated the ability to dismantle core elements of the regime’s power base.

With most of northern Shan captured, the Brotherhood can project force beyond the borderlands and into the centre of the country. Supported by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the second member of the alliance, fighters from some People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) have moved down from the Shan plateau to directly pressure Mandalay, the country’s second-largest city.

The Brotherhood’s newly won position will allow it to enhance support for proxy forces operating in the centre, which could weaken the regime over time. It also offers the potential to assault Mandalay City. If successful, such an operation would open an avenue for attacks on the capital at Naypyidaw, posing an existential threat to the regime. But though this moment might offer a profound opportunity, the Brotherhood groups face their own political and military limitations, making their next moves difficult to predict.

Borderland takeover

The first phase of Operation 1027 began in October last year with the outbreak of fighting between Brotherhood groups and the military, concluding in January with a China-brokered ceasefire. Before that, the Brotherhood had largely stayed out of the nationwide post-coup conflict.

Operation 1027 Part II, which began on 25 June, has allowed the TNLA to entrench itself along the western edge of the Shan plateau. The group’s capture of both Mongmit and Mogoke provides a firm base to support ongoing operations in Mandalay Region by the Mandalay PDF, which it commands. Concurrent control of Nawnghkio enables the TNLA to pressure Pyin Oo Lwin, home to a sizeable regime garrison and the last major line of defence before Mandalay City.

The primary battle zone during Operation 1027 Part II.

Despite these advances, the Brotherhood’s job in northern Shan State is not yet complete. Following the MNDAA’s seizure of Lashio in early August, the alliance turned its efforts toward extending control southward along Routes 41, 44, and 445. These roads are the main links between northern and southern Shan State and could be used for a regime counter-offensive.

By September, however, the MNDAA had paused its offensive operations. Within this lull, the regime is digging in along the new frontline, sending reinforcements to the towns of Namlan and Mongyai. The junta obstructed the MNDAA’s advance in this area in July by inviting the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) to occupy the latter. The SSPP has reportedly begun to draw down its forces, allowing the regime to reassume control in Mongyai Town.

Another complication for the Brotherhood is Hsipaw, which lies near the junction of Highway 3 and Route 44. The town remains guarded by several regime bases that survived the TNLA’s first assault in July. Following a brief interlude, the TNLA relaunched attacks in the town beginning on 14 September and has reportedly captured one of the remaining bases. The TNLA will need to expel the regime from Hsipaw to consolidate control along Highway 3, which once carried the majority of trade between Myanmar and China.

The strategic area around Taung Hkam guards the approach to both Mandalay and Taunggyi.

Since August, the TNLA has fought a pitched battle against regime forces at Taung Hkam. The town is home to four regime artillery bases that threaten the TNLA’s hold over Nawnghkio and, by extension, the main approach to Pyin Oo Lwin and Mandalay. It also guards a key crossing over the Myitnge River along the road to Taunggyi. The terrain here is favourable to the defender, and the local regime garrison has put up stiff resistance. The TNLA was pushed back at least once after suffering casualties, and initial reports that Taung Hkam had fallen were not accurate. The TNLA’s advance appeared to slow after the MNDAA stopped actively fighting across the theatre.

Down from the mountains

Operation 1027 Part II has entailed notable action by the Mandalay PDF in the three lowland townships to the north of Mandalay City: Madaya, Singu and Thabeikkyin. To the south of the city, a loose coalition of PDFs associated with the National Unity Government (NUG) is waging a synchronised offensive across Myingyan District, which includes the townships of Myingyan, Taung Tha, Natogyi and Ngazun. The NUG claims it is leading the offensive, dubbed the Myingyan District Special Operation. The NUG and Brotherhood Alliance are not formal allies but appear to have increased their military coordination since earlier this year.

Lowland townships in Mandalay Region where various PDFs launched attacks in synchronization with Operation 1027 Part II.

Though it managed some limited counter-attacks, the regime’s severe manpower shortages have largely prevented it from responding to the Mandalay PDF in force. Only on 21 September, nearly three months after Operation 1027 Part II began, did the regime deploy a sizeable contingent against a PDF unit that had ventured within 10 kilometres of the city. Otherwise, the army has largely prioritised the threat from the Brotherhood Alliance in Shan State. While recent attacks near Mandalay City are a major embarrassment for the regime, PDFs on their own still lack the firepower, numbers and command and control needed to undertake complex operations on the scale demonstrated by the Brotherhood Alliance. Hence, the regime deems the Brotherhood to be a greater threat than any PDF.

To be successful in the near-term, a PDF assault on Mandalay City would require significant participation from the Brotherhood Alliance. But before any attempt is made, it appears that the TNLA and MNDAA are focused on consolidating control over strategic areas in northern Shan State, like Hsipaw and Taung Hkam. Moreover, the large regime garrison at Pyin Oo Lwin could jeopardise any attempt on Mandalay unless it is first captured by the Brotherhood.

Another consideration is how long it might take for the TNLA and MNDAA to prepare for an assault on Mandalay. This would depend in part on the Brotherhood’s ability to replace the number of fighters lost since June, which is unknown but likely to be high. Taking Mandalay would also require enormous amounts of ammunition, fuel and other supplies that China began restricting when fighting resumed in late June. For reference, it took the Brotherhood less than six months to prepare for Operation 1027 Part II following the ceasefire in January this year.

The recent capture of Lashio underscores the Brotherhood’s capacity for conventional and urban warfare, as well as the regime’s systemic weakness and strategic failure. Nonetheless, taking Mandalay would be a significantly more difficult feat than fighting in the hills. The flat terrain around Mandalay exposes the attacker to junta artillery, airpower and armour. The regime would probably fight harder there than it did in northern Shan given the city’s strategic and symbolic importance: beyond being the second-largest city, Mandalay was a former royal capital. Still, the spectacular fall of Lashio demonstrates that the regime’s ability to defend major cities is not guaranteed.

The rocky road to Mandalay

The road to Mandalay is strewn with numerous political and humanitarian dilemmas for the Brotherhood Alliance and its partners. The MNDAA and TNLA’s recent campaigns have entailed significant territorial expansion beyond their traditional zones, leading to tensions with other groups opposed to the regime. In most cases, the MNDAA and TNLA have set up their own administrations in newly captured areas. In Mogoke, the TNLA installed local PDF commanders to the town’s interim management committee. While this could suggest a willingness to share power, how much control the TNLA might ultimately cede to other groups remains to be seen. Notably, the TNLA appears to have retained full control of the town’s lucrative mining economy.

This raises the question of what sort of political arrangement the NUG envisions for Mandalay if the Brotherhood Alliance plays a major role in the city’s capture. Although the NUG appears to have accepted the Brotherhood’s authority in ethnically mixed areas, it may be more reluctant to see any ethnic armed organisation (EAO) establish authority over parts of the Bamar heartland. Overall, opposition advances across the battlefield continue to outpace the political-bargaining process. With that said, political negotiations among opposition actors partly depend on battlefield outcomes, especially the ability to defend newly captured areas. Much is left uncertain and open-ended as opposition actors negotiate their relationships amidst ever-changing front lines and destabilising attacks by the regime’s air force.

The Mandalay urban centre, 17 March 2019. (Photo: Alamy)

In addition, an assault on Mandalay would inevitably prompt an enormous humanitarian catastrophe. If the fall of Lashio is to serve as any guide, then a month of heavy fighting inside Mandalay could be expected to displace up to 70% of the urban population, estimated at about 1.7 million. Unlike Lashio, it is reasonable to assume that the military would not easily surrender in Mandalay, raising the possibility of a protracted and destructive battle.

For these reasons, it is difficult to assess whether Mandalay’s ethnically mixed population would support an assault on the city, especially if the attempt fails or is inconclusive. Anecdotal evidence paints a mixed picture. In general, the Bamar population appears to remain highly supportive of the war and the NUG. However, resistance forces face significant challenges in holding urban areas after they have been seized, leading to uncertainty and frustrations among war-weary residents, as in the case of the Kayah State capital of Loikaw. The city was nearly seized by resistance forces last November but retaken by the regime after about six months.

Beijing black box

China’s role in Myanmar has loomed especially large since the Brotherhood launched Operation 1027 nearly one year ago, but Beijing’s policies have appeared inconsistent and opaque. Historically, China has hedged its position in Myanmar’s ongoing armed conflicts by providing support to both the military and northern EAOs, and this general approach has continued after the coup. Accordingly, levels of support for either side fluctuate with the evolving battlefield situation. This dynamism makes it hard to tell whether Beijing has any coherent strategy or is just reacting to the situation as it unfolds.

Another consideration is the role of different actors in China and their corresponding interests. Beijing appears primarily concerned with the possibility of total state collapse, and for this reason is more willing to assist the junta, which it believes to have a greater chance of holding the country together than opposition forces. In contrast, the Yunnan provincial government is more sensitive to economic and security dynamics along the border. The Ministry of State Security, China’s primary civilian intelligence arm, is thought to maintain close relationships with the northern EAOs.

As the IISS wrote in June, Beijing responded to the resumption of Operation 1027 with border closures and other actions that appeared to put pressure on the Brotherhood Alliance. But according to one well-placed source, the MNDAA was still able to receive weapons from the Chinese side of the border. While this contradictory behaviour could be a manifestation of a hedging impulse, it could also reflect Beijing’s hitherto tolerance for certain activities carried out by Yunnan-based authorities pursuing their immediate, localised interests.

Another possibility is that Myanmar ranks comparatively low on Beijing’s list of priorities. Though it acted decisively in response to the rise of cyber scamming in northern Shan State, Beijing has otherwise shown limited willingness to utilise every tool that could push the conflict toward a more decisive outcome. In response to the siege of Lashio, for example, China took steps to deter the Brotherhood’s assault on the city but did not exhaust all options. Notably, Beijing did not direct local authorities to arrest MNDAA and TNLA operatives in Yunnan or seize the groups’ assets.

Recent developments reveal the limits of these hedging tendencies, with the junta at visible risk of further battlefield defeats and Beijing struggling to exert a reasonable degree of influence over the EAOs. According to different sources, there is concern in China that the junta’s decline opens the way for outside actors, like the US, to gain influence in Myanmar. In particular, the worry is that the northern EAOs could seek alternative benefactors via their growing relations with the NUG. This anxiety was made evident in Beijing’s recent declaration of three ‘bottom lines’ for Myanmar, which included strong warnings about external interference. It may also explain why Beijing did not do more to stop the siege of Lashio if the fear is that too much pressure will push the EAOs away.

In light of Operation 1027 Part II, there are at least some signs that Beijing is taking more decisive actions to deter the Brotherhood. According to sources close to the junta, China is accelerating weapons transfers to the army, which could include the delivery of UAVs and fixed-wing aircraft. IISS researchers also learned of discussions over financial assistance for the junta, possibly in the form of advanced payments tied to infrastructure projects, but details are limited, and it remains unclear whether the money was delivered. Meanwhile, China has further tightened restrictions on the flow of arms and supplies to the Brotherhood, including by pressuring the United Wa State Army (UWSA) to cease deliveries of military equipment.

Into the unknown

On 4 September the MNDAA issued a statement denying any political or military alliance with the NUG. The group also insisted that it had no plans to attack the cities of Mandalay and Taunggyi. The statement, published in Chinese, was quickly deleted in response to heavy online criticism. In a reflection of mounting Chinese pressure, the MNDAA re-released the statement on 19 September, this time in Burmese.

The MNDAA’s statements may give little indication of its actual intentions. During its siege of Lashio, the group paid lip service to Beijing by declaring two unilateral ceasefires but kept fighting anyway. As the IISS previously assessed, enhanced engagement with the NUG provides the Brotherhood groups with political justification for their continued territorial expansion. All three alliance members have ties to the NUG and other associated resistance outfits, even if they denounce a full-fledged alliance.

The junta’s recent decision to declare the Brotherhood groups as terrorist organisations suggests that it has little or no intention to negotiate peace with them in the near term. While it is possible that the MNDAA could be satisfied with its territorial gains, ongoing regime airstrikes or a future counter-offensive would offer reason for the Brotherhood Alliance to march on Pyin Oo Lwin or Mandalay. As events of the last year demonstrate, the Brotherhood has continually expanded its ambitions as the military weakens. An attack on Mandalay, if successful, would open a path to Naypyidaw.

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