Myanmar conflict update
Regime election plans and prospects for dialogue in Myanmar
Following major opposition victories, neither side appears willing to talk. But pressure from Beijing, including for ceasefires and a regime-organised election, could shake up the conflict outlook.
By Morgan Michaels
Graphics by Anton Dzeviatau
Published November 2024
Following a year of advances made against the regime, Myanmar’s opposition forces are facing a new major challenge, this time from abroad. Increasingly concerned by the prospect of state collapse, Beijing has revealed that it aims to prop up the regime and pressure powerful armed groups into abandoning their offensives. Despite consecutive defeats, the regime hangs on, unwilling to cede territory without fierce fighting. With no other ideas at hand, Beijing is supporting an unpopular election in the hope that it will shake up the junta’s leadership dynamic and create new space for political manoeuvring and conflict de-escalation. But even if the possibility of dialogue comes into view, violence would likely need to escalate before either side agrees to meaningful negotiations.
The MNDAA’s partner, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), has attempted to push towards Mandalay Region, but its progress slowed significantly once the MNDAA disengaged.
After repelling the TNLA at Taung Hkam, the regime launched limited counter-attacks towards Nawnghkio, reducing immediate TNLA pressure on Mandalay. A new frontline had taken shape outside the town by November.
Since May, the Arakan Army has carried out continuous attacks on the No. 5 Border Guard Police post in Maungdaw Town. The regime has fought fiercely to keep the position, its last toehold along the Myanmar–Bangladesh border.
The regime also retains control of the state capital at Sittwe, which has not seen fighting.
In October, the AA launched a major attack on Ann, where the regime’s Western Military Command is located. The position guards the main route in and out of the state, and is vital for both sides.
A communications blackout and ongoing mutual information war has made it difficult to assess the progress of the battle.
In Kayah State, a regime counter-offensive continues to make incremental progress against the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force. Assisted by its ally, the Pa-O National Army, the regime had mostly secured the Kayah–Shan border by November.
With the state capital of Loikaw also recaptured, the regime is preparing to pressure Karenni forces at Demoso, the state’s second-largest town.
Beijing shows its hand
On 19 November, local media reported that Chinese officials in Yunnan had placed Peng Daxun, the leader of the MNDAA, under house arrest. This would represent another clear attempt by Beijing to assist the beleaguered regime. As the IISS wrote in July, Beijing pressured the MNDAA to halt its siege of Lashio, but the group did not comply. According to leaked minutes of a meeting between China’s Special Envoy Deng Xijun and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), Beijing does not accept the capture of Lashio and wants the MNDAA to withdraw. Peng’s arrest appears designed to deter the group from further military advances.
Another key component of China’s strategy is an embargo on essential supplies to areas controlled by the MNDAA and its partner, the TNLA. By late October, China had shut almost its entire border with Myanmar. The closures also affect the ‘neutral’ UWSA, which, as the largest supplier of arms and ammunition to opposition groups, has come under increasing pressure from Beijing to halt sales. Until these dynamics change, it could be difficult for the MNDAA or TNLA to access the necessary supplies of fuel, ammunition and other goods required for another major offensive push.
On 6 November, junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing met Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Kunming on the sidelines of the 8th Greater Mekong Subregion Summit. China’s invitation to Min Aung Hlaing and its increasingly obvious pressure on opposition forces has sparked considerable anger among the Myanmar public. Beijing has attempted to justify its policies through intermediaries sent to meet with various Myanmar and international stakeholders. According to the narrative these intermediaries conveyed, China views the Myanmar military as inseparable from the nation state and equates regime failure with state failure. China does not necessarily prefer the junta but deems it necessary to support the military-controlled central state authority. Deng Xijun expressed this same rationale to the UWSA, as revealed in the leaked meeting minutes.
Election plans
During his meeting with Min Aung Hlaing, Li Qiang also expressed support for the regime’s plan to organise elections sometime in 2025. Unsurprisingly, such plans have stoked intense criticism from opposition groups, the Myanmar public and multiple Western stakeholders. These actors generally see the elections as a regime ploy to reclaim legitimacy and reduce international pressure. They also believe that any elections held under current conditions will not be free or fair, a view that is widely accepted.
For China, however, support for the possible 2025 elections is not about creating the façade of a popular mandate to legitimise the regime’s authority (though this may be an added benefit). Instead, the main hope in Beijing is probably that the elections will generate a new leadership dynamic within the regime by reducing Min Aung Hlaing’s absolute power, creating a possible opening for conflict de-escalation. Given both the provisions of the military-drafted 2008 constitution and the extent of internal dissatisfaction with his leadership, it should be difficult for Min Aung Hlaing to secure the roles of both commander-in-chief and president following the elections. In theory, Min Aung Hlaing will need to choose one of the two, opening a space for someone else to assume the other.
China’s support for the elections entails several major risks. Though certain international stakeholders can probably accept a lack of fairness, current conditions could prevent the regime from staging the elections with even superficial legitimacy. This could make it harder for some neighbours to endorse the results, especially if, as seems likely, the elections incite more violence. More importantly, the plan will fail if Min Aung Hlaing finds a way to retain his total grip on power or avoid elections altogether. Even if the elections shake up the current power structure, a new commander-in-chief will face pressure to reverse losses, meaning that violence could escalate before support for dialogue within the regime emerges.
An emerging, albeit slim, chance for dialogue
On 25 November, the TNLA signalled a willingness to engage in peace talks with the regime, but fighting between the two sides continued into December. The TNLA’s expanded presence near Mandalay Region is an acute threat that the regime cannot afford to leave unchecked. Therefore, the TNLA’s offer is probably a tactical attempt to appease China and buy time ahead of an expected regime counteroffensive along the Mandalay—Shan border.
At present, neither the regime nor the key opposition actors appear willing to seriously negotiate. Following their remarkable battlefield advances throughout 2024, most opposition forces probably believe they can continue to win territory or even topple the regime. Though there is no reliable data regarding public opinion, narratives that reject dialogue with the regime remain dominant. This makes it difficult for opposition parties to engage in or even publicly consider peace talks.
While it may pursue tactical ceasefires with some groups, the regime appears unwilling to accept the major losses it has suffered in Kachin, Shan, Rakhine, Kayah and Kayin. Rather than leading to a snowball collapse, serial losses appear to be deepening the regime’s siege mentality and resolve. Following the main thrust of Operation 1027, the regime forces’ overall rate of surrender declined, its airstrikes on civilian and military targets drastically increased, and its soldiers put up fanatical resistance at their final holdouts in northern Shan and Rakhine states. Despite widespread discontent with Min Aung Hlaing, the military’s internal cohesion has endured, according to interviews with intermediaries and individuals close to the junta. Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to China also suggests he was not concerned by the risk of internal mutiny during his absence.
The regime is unlikely to pursue peace talks with key opposition groups until it can roll back some of its worst losses. With up to 30,000 new conscripts, the army will probably seek to wage counter-offensives in Shan, Rakhine and maybe Kachin within the next six months. Unless China changes its stance again — as it has done multiple times — or opposition forces launch major pre-emptive offensives, then the regime could claw back some territories next year (it is already reversing losses in Kayah State and Mandalay Region). A new military balance could emerge if the regime demonstrates its vitality and opposition forces realise they can go no further. Should this scenario, the likelihood of which remains to be seen, coincide with a leadership opening created by the elections, then dialogue may become possible.