Myanmar conflict update
Battle for Kayah is key for Myanmar junta and its opponents
The battle for Kayah State, which is strategically located between resistance strongholds in the Dry Zone and the southeast, is now the longest episode of sustained, relatively high-intensity combat since Myanmar’s post-coup war began.
By Morgan Michaels
Graphics by Brody Smith
Published June 2023
Kayah State is home to a variety of ethnic subgroups known collectively as the Karenni. One of Myanmar’s oldest armed movements, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), agreed to ceasefires with the Myanmar military government in 2012, ushering in a decade of relative stability.
The military’s coup in February 2021, however, shattered the promise of peace and reignited the revolutionary spirit among the Karenni. Amidst a surge of anti-junta sentiment, the KNPP provided arms and training to People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) formed by Karenni youths. These PDFs later combined into the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF), one of the strongest armed movements to emerge since the coup.
After a massacre, renewed fighting
In January 2022, Karenni resistance fighters responded to the Christmas Eve massacre of at least 31 civilians with a major offensive against Loikaw, the state capital of Kayah, and Demoso, the second-largest town. Though the junta repelled the attack after weeks of urban combat, a subsequent clearance operation failed to uproot Karenni units from their foothold in the surrounding countryside. Since then, the junta has struggled to cut off resistance supply lines or prevent fighters from continually threatening the state’s key strategic sites.
To break the deadlock, in March 2023 the junta launched a large-scale offensive to dislodge Karenni fighters from their strongholds. After achieving only mixed results, the junta now appears focused on seizing control of the state’s main roads and strategic junctions. Doing so would allow it to stem the flow of weapons and ammunition, as well as basic commodities on which civilians depend, such as rice and medicine. An effective blockade could eventually exhaust resistance groups and their supporters, potentially allowing the junta to impose a ceasefire before turning its attention elsewhere.
For anti-junta forces, resisting the regime’s siege and maintaining a foothold in Kayah is paramount. The state is situated at a highly strategic junction, serving as a link between resistance strongholds to the south and north and offering a potential launching pad for attacks on Naypyidaw, Myanmar’s capital. It also offers vital connections to Thailand – a source of weapons and humanitarian supplies – as well as Shan State, where the country’s most powerful armed groups operate.
The junta surges troops into the area
In February 2023, the junta began gathering a large strike force by pulling individual battalions from its Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs) and Military Operations Commands (MOCs) deployed elsewhere in Rakhine and Shan states. These units joined about 2,000 soldiers already in place, bringing the total attacking force to upwards of 5,000 troops. The military is also receiving significant assistance from an ethnic militia, the Pa-O National Army (PNA), which since the coup has worked actively to call up reserves and recruit new fighters, bringing its own strength to approximately 5,000.
Regime forces and their proxies are up against an estimated 3,000 armed KNPP fighters. While the KNDF boasts some 8,800 members, only a quarter are armed with automatic rifles. Hundreds of fighters from local PDFs are also active in the theatre.
Regime forces
Resistance forces
Manoeuvres
An uncertain outlook
The junta’s ongoing offensive has involved direct assaults on fortified resistance bases and stronghold areas. In some cases, Karenni fighters have blocked or repelled advancing junta columns, inflicting high losses. The regime initially responded to these setbacks by committing more resources to the theatre to wage repeated attacks on Karenni positions and camps. It also stepped up the use of airstrikes, directing its aircraft against even minor targets.
The regime’s ground and air attacks have inflicted high costs on Karenni forces and their civilian supporters. In May, the KNDF admitted to numerous casualties, including the death of a battalion commander, and uploaded photos to social media showing funerals and widespread destruction. On 6 June, the KNDF revealed what appeared to be two Type-85 heavy machine guns that it had crowdfunded for the stated purpose of air defence. While they might be effective against low-flying helicopters, these weapons are unlikely to pose much risk to the military’s fixed-wing aircraft. Nor are they sufficient to cover the vast expanse of the battlefield.
Though under immense pressure, Karenni units have remained motivated, fighting for the defence of their families and homes. Local fighters benefit from their superior knowledge of the terrain, making it easier for them to launch surprise ambushes and escape junta attacks. Several of the main battle sites remain contested, demonstrating that Karenni fighters have managed to stay in the fight and retain their presence in key areas.
Yet the ultimate outcome of the battle may not hinge entirely on the tactical prowess of either side. Most of Kayah State’s population is already displaced and in urgent need of assistance, with reports from the ground indicating a severe shortage of food and medicine. Whether the Karenni resistance can sustain the fight will depend, in large part, on its ability to see the population through a worsening humanitarian crisis.